Secure Montgomery Multiplication and Repeated Squares for Modular
  Exponentiation by Bloom, Justin & Devadas, Lalita
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
02
34
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  5
 O
ct 
20
19
SECURE MONTGOMERY MULTIPLICATION AND REPEATED
SQUARES FOR MODULAR EXPONENTIATION
JUSTIN BLOOM AND LALITA DEVADAS
Advisor: Dr. Mike Rosulek
Oregon State University
Abstract
The BMR16 circuit garbling scheme [1] introduces gadgets that allow for ciphertext-free
modular addition, while the multiplication of private inputs modulo a prime p can be done
with 2(p− 1) ciphertexts as described in [3]. By using a residue number system (RNS), we
can construct a circuit to handle the squaring and multiplication of inputs modulo a large
N via the methods described in [2]. We expand on the existing techniques for arithmetic
modulo p to develop methods to handle arithmetic in a positional, base-p number system.
We evaluate the ciphertext cost of both of these methods and compare their performance
for squaring in various large moduli.
1. Introduction
1.1. Secure Multiparty Computation. Multiparty computation (MPC) is a process in
which two parties, Alice and Bob, have private information x1, x2 ∈ X , and an operation
using each party’s information F : X2 → Y is computed. If y = F (x1, x2) can somehow be
computed and made public so that Alice can not find the value of x2 and Bob can not find
the value of x1, then this process is called secure MPC.
Circuit garbling is a technique that provides a means for how a secure MPC scheme can
be constructed. Alice and Bob devise a circuit abstraction of F , breaking down the sub-
processes needed in the computation of F into gates with input and output wires. A gate
with k input wires from a space X and n output wires for a space Y , and functionality
f : Xk → Y n, can be naively implemented with n lookup tables (one per output wire). Each
lookup table has |X|k entries for the possible values held by the input wires. Alice and Bob
can flip a coin to decide who shall act as a “garbler” and who shall act as an “evaluator”.
Without trying to be clever, the garbler makes public a set of n|X|k ciphertexts that an
evaluator could decrypt to recover each output of f . The garbler generates these ciphertexts
by encrypting the outputs of f using a key that is an encoding of the appropriate inputs,
where the code being used satisfies the following:
(1) The evaluator knows which ciphertext to decrypt given k input wires that hold an
encoding of the inputs.
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(2) The evaluator is only able to find an authentic plaintext from decrypting the correct
ciphertext using the key derived from the input wires.
We make no assumptions on the physical capabilities of either the evaluator or the gar-
bler, and instead assume that the bottlenecking factor in the entire garbling protocol is the
communication of all necessary ciphertexts from the garbler to the evaluator. Hence we
gauge the efficiency of a garbling scheme by the number of necessary ciphertexts, called the
ciphertext cost.
1.2. Our Results. By building off of arithmetic garbling techniques by Ball, Malkin and
Rosulek [1], we give two approaches for garbling circuits that perform modular exponenti-
ation. For the repeated squares fast exponentiation algorithm, we need an efficient means
for squaring, and multiplying modulo N and so we explore our options for a unary squaring
gate, and a boolean multiplication gate.
1.2.1. The RNS Approach. The first approach is using an RNS with relatively prime moduli
pi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k (called the native moduli), where we can use small unary gates that square
an input in a prime modulus to find the square of an input given in RNS representation.
Then, using algorithms from [2], given an RNS representation of some residues x, y <
∏
pi
we can find the RNS representation for x2 mod N or xy mod N for known conditions on
N , without the costly operation of dividing by N .
Since N is assumed to be large, not only is it computationally expensive to divide by N
in our native moduli, but it would would be infeasible to garble the entirety of a single gate
for arithmetic in ZN , and so we refer to N as the non-native modulus.
Therefore, we can garble a circuit consisting of many arithmetic gates connected to the
initital output from squaring in each native modulus, to perform the appropriate computation
from the algorithms described in [2].
1.2.2. The Base-p Approach. We compare the ciphertext cost of the RNS ciruit with our
second approach, which uses a positional, base-p number system for some prime p. We first
expand the ideas of free modular addition and multiplication by a public constant from [1]
to find the cost of base-p addition and multiplication with single-digit input wires.
For addition, we find the ciphertext cost of garbling a gate with m input wires for single-
digit integers and two output wires representing the two digits of the output sum. The
least significant position is exactly the output of the inputs’ sum modulo p, while the most
significant position is computed using the technique in section 4.1.2. Since the output must
be two digits (where 0 is possible for either position), we assume m ≤ p + 1. We use this
construction to generalize the cost of garbling a circuit which computes the sum of integers
with many digits represented in base-p.
For multiplication, we develop a ‘base-case’ for multiplying two single digit numbers
(bounded by p) in base-p with two output wires for the digits of the output (which must
be bounded by p2), and we simplify our technique for a similar single-digit base-case for
squaring. Then using the classical divide-and-conquer Karatsuba algorithm, we find the
ciphertext cost of multiplying and squaring for any digit base-p representations.
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2. Background and Notation
We will take a look at garbled circuit constructions, or “gadgets” to build off of, and some
techniques in arithmetic that motivate our results. We denote the ring of integers modulo
m by Zm, and we denote the direct product of rings R and R
′ by R× R′. For an integer x,
we denote the unique residue x mod m in [0, m) by [x]m unless stated otherwise.
2.1. Current Garbling Schemes. The details of how the ciphertext cost of a circuit can
be improved are usually in how the possible values of a gate are encoded. Ball, Malkin and
Rosulek [1] developed an encoding technique that allows for addition in a fixed modulus,
without any ciphertexts needed. The evaluator only needs the encodings of two vectors over
Zm to find the encoding of their sum, and so an adder-gate can be garbled for free. Using a
similar technique, a unary gate that multiplies an input in Zm by a public constant can be
garbled for free if the constant is relatively prime to m.
For computations involving modular arithmetic in multiple moduli, a “mixed-modulus
simple circuit” can be constructed by using an additional kind of unary gate, that [1] calls
“projection”. A gate representing a projection from Zm to Zn can be garbled with m − 1
ciphertexts.
Finally, for a prime modulus p, Malkin, Pastro and Shelat [3] describe a technique for
multiplying two private inputs in Zp which costs 2(p− 1)
2.2. Classical Montgomery Arithmetic. 1 Despite the improvements made for efficient
multiplication, division generally remains costly, and so repeated division by a large, non-
native modulus N is not an efficient way to produce residues modulo N . Instead, we use
classical Montgomery Arithmetic on numbers represented in base-p to perform addition and
multiplication modulo N without costly division [4]. To do this, we take advantage of trivial
multiplication and division by powers of p for numbers represented in base-p.
2.2.1. Montgomery Representation. We takeM to be the nativeMontgomery Modulus which
is chosen to be pk for some k. To do arithmetic on inputs X and Y represented in base-
p, we first compute the base-p representation for the residues of x := XM mod N and
y := YM mod N , called the Montgomery Representations of X and Y respectively. These
representations are pre-computed with a division by N each, but given inputs already in
Montgomery representation, it is easy to find the montgomery representation of operations
using inputs, without division by N . For addition, we can simply take the sum x + y =
XM + YM ≡ (X + Y )M mod N , to find the montgomery represenation of (X + Y ).
2.2.2. Multiplication. Multiplying two inputs in Montgomery representation yields an extra
factor of M, and so instead we use a technique to compute xy/M = (XM)(YM)/M = XYM .
First we precompute q := N−1 mod M by the Euclidean algorithm, and we take w := xy.
Then we compute the residue u := −wq mod M by taking the last k digits of nM−wq for a
sufficiently large n. Then (w+uN) ≡ w−wqN ≡ w(1−qN) ≡ 0 mod M , and therefore the
least significant k digits of (w + uN) are 0 in base-p. Furthermore, (w + uN) ≡ w mod N
1Here, we refer to base-p Montgomery algorithms as “Classical Montgomery Arithmetic” to distinguish
them from the RNS algorithms, which are also named after Peter Montgomery.
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and therefore truncating k zeros from (w+uN) is equivalent to taking (w+uN)M−1 ≡ wM−1
mod N .
It is important to note that (w+uN)/M does not necessarily produce a residue bounded by
N , because we can only guarentee that w+uN < N2+MN ≤ 2NM , and so (w+uN)/M <
2N .
2.3. Residue Number Systems. For relatively prime integers p1, p2, ..., pk, letM =
∏k
i=1 pi.
Then the Chinese Remainder Theorem induces an isomorphism ϕ : ZM → Zp1×Zp2×...×Zpk ,
where ϕ : [x]M 7→ ([x]p1 , [x]p2, ..., [x]pk). A Residue Number System (RNS) is a way to rep-
resent x, a residue modulo M , by a vector of residues given by ϕ(x), so that arithmetic
in ZM can be delegated to k operations in each pi, which can be done in parallel. We use
b = (p1, p2, ..., pk) to denote an RNS with moduli pi. We call M =
∏k
i=1 pi the dynamical
range of b, since essentially any operation over the integers which does not exceed the dy-
namical range M can be done in b so that the output can be fully recovered. We use JxKb to
denote the representation of x in the RNS b.
Hollmann, Rietman, Hoogh, Tolhuizen, and Gorissen [2] developed a recursive RNS algo-
rithm to perform arithmetic in a non-native modulus. We provide a ciphertext cost analysis
for a garbled circuit implementation of [2] in section 3.
2.4. Positional Number Systems. An integer x satisfying 0 ≤ x ≤ pk − 1 can be repre-
sented in a positional, base-p number system with k positions, or digits. We choose a prime
number p as our base, to simplify assumptions needed for later computations. Arithmetic
done in a positional number system requires keeping track of a carry digit. As such, k-digit
inputs are unlikely to result in k-digit outputs. For additon, we first consider the simplest
case, a gate with m single-digit input wires (bounded by p), where m ≤ p + 1, and two
output wires for the digits of the output, which is bounded by p2 − 1. We show in section
4.1.1 that the cost to garble the summation of all m inputs is 2pm−m− 1.
Multiplying numbers represented in base-p can be done efficiently by the Karatsuba al-
gorithm, and so we develop the base case of multiplying two single-digit numbers with a
two-digit output in section 4.1.2, which we found to have a ciphertext cost of 14p− 10. We
then provide a recurrence relation for the ciphertext cost of a full implementation of the
Karatsuba algorithm in section 4.2. Finally, we use Karatsuba multiplication to find the
cost of multiplying two numbers in a non-native modulus in section 4.3.
For squaring, we take a similar divide-and-conquer approach for the initial multiplication
done in classical Montgomery multiplication. The Karatsuba algorithm can be adapted as
a recursive call to a unary squaring operation, and as such we provide a recurrence relation
for the ciphertext cost of Karatsuba squaring in section 4.4.
3. The Recursive RNS Method
To find the total ciphertext cost of multiplying modulo N in an RNS, we follow the steps
outlined in [2].
3.1. Setup. We will use English letters to denote public constants and Greek letters to
denote private variables; lowercase letters represent variables in the bottom level RNS and
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uppercase letters represent variables in the top level RNS. We will implement Montgomery
multiplication in a setup as follows.
On the bottom level, we have a left RNS b = (p1, p2, . . . , pk) with Montgomery constant
m equal to the dynamical range
∏k
i=1 pi, and a right RNS b
′ = (pk+1, pk+2, . . . , p2k) with
dynamical range m′ =
∏2k
i=k+1 pi. We define constants ci =
{
m/pi 1 ≤ i ≤ k
m′/pi k + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k
and
take a redundant modulus p0 ≥ ⌈kt⌉ where t = the expansion constant for pseudo-residues.
For convenience, we let b∗ = (p0, pk+1, pk+2, . . . , p2k).
On the top level, we have a left RNS B = (P1, P2, . . . , PK) with Montgomery constant M
equal to the dynamical range
∏K
i=1 Pi, and a right RNS B
′ = (PK+1, PK+2, . . . , P2K) with
dynamical rangeM ′ =
∏2K
i=K+1 Pi. To ensure we can perform arithmetic in every modulus on
this level, we require that 0 < (k+2)2Pi < min(m,m
′) and gcd(Pi, m) = 1 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2K. We
define constants Ci =
{
M/Pi 1 ≤ i ≤ K
M ′/Pi K + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2K
and take a redundant modulus P0 = p0pq
for some 1 ≤ q ≤ 2k with P0 ≥ ⌈KT ⌉ where T = the expansion constant for pseudo-residues.
For convenience, we let B∗ = (P0, Pk+1, Pk+2, . . . , P2k). The modulus N we want to compute
in must satisfy 0 < (K + 2)2N < min(M,M ′) and gcd(N,M) = 1.
3.2. Bajard-Imbert Montgomery RNS algorithm. Given JαKb∪b∗ , JβKb∪b∗ , where α, β ∈
[0, tn), we want to compute
JαKb∪b∗ ⊗n,m JβKb∪b∗ = JζKb∪b∗ where ζ ≡ αβm
−1 mod n and ζ ∈ [0, tn).
When this algorithm is used on its own to perform Montgomery multiplications, n is the
non-native modulus. When it is called as a subroutine by the recursive Montgomery RNS
algorithm, as we will see in the next section, n is one of the moduli from the second layer.
Before executing the algorithm, we precompute all necessary inverses using the Euclidean
algorithm. This does not factor into our cost calculation.
We begin by computing
JθKb∪b∗ = JαKb∪b∗JβKb∪b∗
by modular multiplication. This costs
∑2k
i=0(2pi−2) ciphertexts if both operands are private
variables, and is free if one operand is a public constant. For squaring, we can reduce the
cost of finding JxK2b∪b∗ down to
∑2k
i=0 pi − 1.
Next, we compute
[µi]pi = [θ]pi[c
−1
i ]pi[−n
−1]pi
for each pi ∈ b by modular multiplication (which is free because only one operand is a private
variable). We then project
[µi]pi 7→ JµiciKb∗
for each pi ∈ b. This costs (k + 1)
∑k
i=1(pi − 1) ciphertexts, since each residue mod pi is
projected to k+1 other moduli. We have to move to the right RNS in order to divide by m
(the dynamical range of the left RNS), since m ≡ 0 mod pi ∀pi ∈ b, eg. m has no inverse
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in the left RNS. Computing
JµKb∗ =
k∑
i=1
JµiciKb∗ and JζKb∗ = (JθKb∗ + nJµKb∗)Jm
−1Kb∗
by modular addition and multiplication is free. Now we have to move back to the left RNS,
which we will do via generalized base extension using the redundant modulus. We first
compute
[ηi]pi = [ζ ]pi[c
−1
i ]pi
for each pi ∈ b
′ by modular multiplication (which again is free because only one operand is
a private variable). Next, we project
[ηi]pi 7→ [ηi]p0
for each pi ∈ b
′ for
∑2k
i=k+1(pi − 1) ciphertexts. Computing
[ω]p0 = [−m
−1]p0[ζ ]p0 +
2k∑
i=k+1
[γi]p0 [p
−1
i ]p0
by modular addition and multiplication is free. To apply the base extension to the left RNS,
we must project
[ω]p0 7→ JωKb and [ηi]pi 7→ JηiKb
for each pi ∈ b
′, which costs k(p0 − 1) + k
∑2k
i=k+1(pi − 1) ciphertexts, since the residue
mod p0 and each residue mod pi is projected to k other moduli. We can now complete the
base extension by computing
JζKb =
2k∑
i=k+1
ciJηiKb −m
′JωKb
by modular addition and multiplication for free. We now have JζKb∪b∗ as desired, for a total
cost of (k + 1)
∑2k
i=0(pi − 1) − (p0 − 1), plus
∑2k
i=0(2pi − 2) if both operands are private
variables.
3.3. 2-layer Montgomery multiplication RNS algorithm.
Subroutines. To implement the 2-layer Montgomery multiplication RNS algorithm, we need
several subroutines on the bottom layer. One is the Bajard-Imbert Montgomery multipli-
cation algorithm described above. We will refer to everything in said algorithm after the
multiplication θ = αβ as Montgomery reduction, denoted R(n,m)(JθKb∪b∗) = JζKb∪b∗ where
ζ ≡ θm−1 mod n and ζ ∈ [0, tn) if θ ∈ [0, t2n2).
We also need the multiply-and-accumulate algorithm, which given
JdiKb∪b∗ , JωiKb∪b∗ where di ∈ [0, n) and ωi ∈ [0, tn) for 1 ≤ i ≤ s
produces
Sn(d1, . . . , ds;ω1, . . . , ωs) = JζKb∪b∗ where ζ ≡ d1ω1 + · · ·+ dsωs mod n and ζ ∈ [0, tn).
We can precompute
JfiKb∪b∗ = J [m
⌈logt s⌉di]n Kb∪b∗
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for 1 ≤ i ≤ s, so this does not factor into our total cost. We begin by computing
JζiKb∪b∗ = JdiKb∪b∗JωiKb∪b∗
for 1 ≤ i ≤ s. We will iterate the next part of the algorithm as many times as needed.
(∗) We let l be the number of JζiKb∪b∗s. If l > t, we partition the index set of the JζiKb∪b∗s
into sets I1, . . . , Ir so |Ij| ≤ t for 1 ≤ j ≤ r. Otherwise, we skip to (∗∗). We then compute
JθjKb∪b∗ =
∑
i∈Ij
JζiKb∪b∗ and JζjKb∪b∗ = R(n,m)(JθjKb∪b∗)
for 1 ≤ j ≤ r. This costs r
(
(k + 1)
∑2k
i=0(pi − 1)− (p0 − 1)
)
ciphertexts. We return to (∗)
and repeat.
(∗∗) We can now compute
JθKb∪b∗ =
l∑
j=1
JζjKb∪b∗ and JζKb∪b∗ = R(n,m)(JθKb∪b∗)
for (k + 1)
∑2k
i=0(pi − 1)− (p0 − 1) ciphertexts. This gives us a total cost of(∑⌊logt s⌋
i=1
s
ti
+ 1
)(
(k + 1)
∑2k
i=0(pi − 1)− (p0 − 1)
)
ciphertexts.
Implementation. With these three subroutines, we can implement Montgomery multiplica-
tion in a 2-layer RNS. For convenience, we write (α)P0 to denote ([α]p0, [α]pq) and (α)Pi to
denote Jα mod PiKb∪b∗ for Pi ∈ B ∪ B
′. Given
((α)P0, (α)P1, . . . , (α)P2K), ((β)P0, (β)P1, . . . , (β)P2K) where α, β ∈ [0, TN),
we want to compute
((ζ)P0, (ζ)P1, . . . , (ζ)P2K) where ζ ≡ βγM
−1 mod N and ζ ∈ [0, TN).
We begin by computing
(θ)Pi = (β)Pi ⊗Pi,m (γ)Pi
for each Pi ∈ B ∪ B
′. This costs 2K
(∑2k
i=0(2pi − 2) + (k + 1)
∑2k
i=0(pi − 1)− (p0 − 1)
)
ciphertexts, because we have to do 2K Montgomery multiplications on the bottom level.
These multiplications must use the Montgomery algorithm to ensure that the results are
pseudo-residues mod Pi, since regular multiplication wouldn’t guarantee any bounds in
terms of Pi. The redundant modulus P0 is the product of two moduli from the lower level,
so we have to handle arithmetic mod P0 differently. We can compute
(θ)P0 = (α)P0(γ)P0
by modular multiplication, for 2(p0 + pq) − 4 ciphertexts. Having precomputed (Ai)Pi =
J [−N−1C−1i m
2]Pi Kb∪b∗ for Pi ∈ B, we can now compute
(µi)Pi = (θ)Pi ⊗Pi,m (Ai)Pi
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for each Pi ∈ B, for K
(
(k + 1)
∑2k
i=0(pi − 1)− (p0 − 1)
)
ciphertexts. We then compute
(ζ)P0 = (θ)P0(M
−1)P0 +
K∑
i=1
(µi)P0(NP
−1
i )P0
for free by modular addition and multiplication. With precomputations of (Di,0)Pi =
J [M−1m]Pi Kb∪b∗ for Pi ∈ B
′ and (Di,j)Pi = J [NP
−1
j ]Pi Kb∪b∗ for Pi ∈ B
′, Pj ∈ B, we
use the multiply-and-accumulate subroutine to compute
(ζ)Pi = SPi((Di,0)Pi, (Di,1)Pi, . . . , (Di,K)Pi; (θ)Pi, (µ1)P1 , . . . , (µK)PK )
for each Pi ∈ B
′. This costs K
(∑⌊logt(K+1)⌋
i=1
K+1
ti
+ 1
)(
(k + 1)
∑2k
i=0(pi − 1)− (p0 − 1)
)
ciphertexts, since we have K + 1 inputs to the subroutine and run it K times. We now
have our desired result in the upper right RNS and the redundant modulus, but need to
use base extension to move it back to the upper left RNS. Given precomputed (Ei)Pi =
J [C−1i m]Pi Kb∪b∗ for Pi ∈ B, we then compute
(αi)Pi = (ζ)Pi ⊗Pi,m (Ei)Pi
for each Pi ∈ B
′. This costs K
(
(k + 1)
∑2k
i=0(pi − 1)− (p0 − 1)
)
ciphertexts, since we are
doing K Montgomery multiplications on the bottom layer (for the same reasoning as stated
above). We now compute
(ω)P0 = (ζ)P0(−M
′−1)P0 +
2K∑
i=K+1
(αi)P0(P
−1
i )P0
by modular addition and multiplication for free. We don’t need to project the αis to get
each (αi)P0 because P0 is the product of moduli on the bottom layer, and each αi is already
represented as residues in every bottom layer moduli. However, to go in the other direction
we do need to project
(ω)P0 7→ JωKb∪b∗
for (2k + 1)(P0 − 1) ciphertexts, since we are projecting to 2k + 1 moduli. To complete the
base extension to the upper left RNS, we need precomputations of (Di,0)Pi = J [−M
′]Pi Kb∪b∗
for Pi ∈ B and (Di,j)Pi = J [Cj]Pi Kb∪b∗ for Pi ∈ B,Pj ∈ B
′ plugged into the multiply-and-
accumulate subroutine to compute
(ζ)Pi = SPi((Di,0)Pi, (Di,K+1)Pi, . . . , (Di,2K)Pi; JωKb∪b∗ , (αK+1)PK+1 , . . . , (α2K)P2K )
for each Pi ∈ B. This costs K
(∑⌊logt(K+1)⌋
i=1
K+1
ti
+ 1
)(
(k + 1)
∑2k
i=0(pi − 1)− (p0 − 1)
)
ciphertexts, since again we have K+1 inputs to the subroutine and run it K times. We now
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have ((ζ)P0, (ζ)P1, . . . , (ζ)P2K) as desired, for a total cost of
2(p0 + pq)− 4 + 2K
2k∑
i=0
(2pi − 2) + (2k + 1)(P0 − 1)
+K

3 + 2

⌈logt(K+1)⌉∑
i=1
K + 1
ti
+ 1




(
(k + 1)
2k∑
i=0
(pi − 1)− (p0 − 1)
)
ciphertexts.
4. Circuits With Base-p Input Wires
4.1. Basic addition and multiplication.
4.1.1. Cost of addition. Adding m residues in base p (where m ≤ p+1 to ensure the overflow
is limited to a single digit) costs 2mp − m − 1 ciphertexts. First, the residues are added
mod p for free to find the less significant digit of the sum. Then each residue is cast to Zmp
for p − 1 ciphertexts each (for a total of m(p − 1) ciphertexts), and the projected residues
are added mod mp for free. Lastly, the sum mod mp is projected to the appropriate carry
digit in Zp for mp− 1 ciphertexts.
4.1.2. Cost of single-digit multiplication. In [1], a discrete-logarithm technique for multiply-
ing in Zp (for prime p) is described. We define a discrete logarithm d : Zp\{0} → Zp−1, where
d : ga 7→ a for some fixed multiplicative generator g ∈ Zp \ {0}. Then, since g
agb = ga+b, we
can multiply two private inputs x, y ∈ Zp \{0} by adding d(x)+d(y) without any ciphertext
cost, and taking gd(x)+d(y) = xy.
Suppose now that we wish to multiply two private variable residues [A]p and [B]p. We can
compute the less significant digit of the product by multiplying in Zp for 2p− 2 ciphertexts,
but computing the carry digit is more involved. First we check if either residue is 0 for 2p
ciphertexts. If not, we have
[A]p = g
a − αp, [B]p = g
b − βp
(equalities in Z) for g a generator in Zp. We can project [A]p and [B]p to a, α, b, β for 4p− 4
ciphertexts. Then
[A]p · [B]p = (g
a − αp)(gb − βp) = ga+b + p
(
αβp− gbα− gaβ
)
.
If we compute c = a+ b in Z2p−1 for free, we have
[A]p · [B]p = [g
c]p + p
(⌊
gc
p
⌋
+ αβp− gbα− gaβ
)
.
We can project c to
⌊
gc
p
⌋
for 2p − 2 ciphertexts. Since the carry digit is bounded by p
(because the product is bounded by p2), we can compute it in Zp as⌊
gc
p
⌋
+ αβp− gbα− gaβ ≡
⌊
gc
p
⌋
− [B]pα− [A]pβ mod p.
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This requires two Zp multiplications for 2p−2 ciphertexts each, bringing the total to 14p−10
ciphertexts to multiply single digit numbers in base-p.
Multiplication by a public constant is significantly cheaper, since all multiplication in Zp
is free and we have fewer lookups to do. If we let [B]p be a public constant, we only need
p − 1 ciphertexts to check if [A]p = 0, 2p − 2 ciphertexts to lookup a and α, and 2p − 2
ciphertexts to lookup
⌊
gc
p
⌋
, for a total of 5p− 5 ciphertexts.
4.2. Implementing Karatsuba multiplication algorithm. For multiplication of many-
digit base p numbers, we resort to the Karatsuba algorithm. Since our implementation of
Karatsuba requires fast negation, we use “p’s complement” notation. An m-digit base p
number is represented by m mod p wires and one mod 2 wire which keeps track of the
sign. Like in two’s complement, negation requires flipping every digit and adding 1. To flip
a digit on a mod p wire, we send a 7→ p − 1 − a. Flipping digits on mod 2 wires is just a
standard bit flip satisfying. Both procedures are free.
Suppose we wish to multiply two m-digit base p numbers X and Y . We can split each
number in half so we have
X = X1p
⌈m/2⌉ +X0, Y = Y1p
⌈m/2⌉ + Y0,
where X1, Y1 are ⌈m/2⌉-digit base p numbers and X0, Y0 are ⌊m/2⌋-digit base p numbers.
Karatsuba’s algorithm allows us to perform only 3 (instead of 4 as required by the schoolbook
algorithm) multiplications of these parts. Each multiplication is recursively performed with
the Karatsuba algorithm, until the operands have few enough digits that it is more efficient
to use schoolbook multiplication (multiplying every digit of one operand by every digit of
the other and adding all the products). The first two multiplications are
A = X0 · Y0, C = X1 · Y1,
of ⌈m/2⌉ and ⌊m/2⌋ digits, respectively. The next multiplication is more involved. First we
compute
X ′ = X0 −X1, Y
′ = Y1 − Y0
for 12⌈m/2⌉p − 8⌈m/2⌉ ciphertexts. Next we take the absolute value of X ′ and Y ′ (by
negating if the sign bit is 1) for 8⌈m/2⌉p − 6⌈m/2⌉ ciphertexts. Then we can perform our
last multiplication
B = |X ′| · |Y ′|,
of ⌈m/2⌉ digits. If X ′ and Y ′ originally had different signs, we now negate B for 4⌈m/2⌉p−
3⌈m/2⌉ ciphertexts. Lastly, we compute our desired product
X · Y = Cpm + Cp⌈m/2⌉ +Bp⌈m/2⌉ + Ap⌈m/2⌉ + A
for 10mp− 6m+ 4⌈m/2⌉p− 3⌈m/2⌉ ciphertexts. Thus we have a recurrence
T (m) = 2T (⌈m/2⌉) + T (⌊m/2⌋) + 10mp− 6m+ 28⌈m/2⌉p− 20⌈m/2⌉
which, by the Master Theorem, gives us an asymptotic bound of T (m) = Θ(mlog2 3).
Many-digit multiplication by a public constant uses the exact same Karatsuba algorithm,
but is cheaper because the base case of the recursion is a schoolbook multiplication by a
constant, which uses single-digit multiplication by a constant (5p− 5 ciphertexts) instead of
single-digit multiplication of private variables (14p− 12 ciphertexts).
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4.3. Implementing classical Montgomery arithmetic. Now that we have all the nec-
essary arithmetic operations, we can implement classical Montgomery multiplication in base
p. We precompute
(q)p = (N
−1 mod pk)p.
Multiplying
(θ)p = (α)p(β)p
requires a Karatsuba multiplication of k digits. Although (θ)p has 2k digits, since the next
multiplication
(µ)p = −(θ)p(q)p mod p
k
is over Zpk , we can ignore the k more significant digits of (θ)p, and so this requires only a
Karatsuba multiplication by a constant of k digits. The next multiplication
(γ)p = (µ)p(N)p
is also a Karatsuba multiplication by a constant of k digits. Computing
(ζ)p = ((θ)p + (γ)p)≫ k
requires a 12kp− 2p− 8k + 1 addition and a free bit shift. Lastly, we compute
(ζ ′)p = (ζ)p − (N)p
for 6kp − 4k ciphertexts. If the sign bit of (ζ ′)p is 0 (which means (ζ)p ≥ (N)p), we set
(ζ)p = (ζ
′)p.
4.4. Squaring in Base-p. For the special case of squaring a single m-digit base p number
X , we take a slightly different approach. We still split X in half and compute
A = X0 ·X0, C = X1 ·X1,
two recursive squarings of ⌊m/2⌋ and ⌈m/2⌉ digits, respectively. For the third multiplication,
we compute
X ′ = X1 +X0, B = X
′ ·X ′
for 6⌈m/2⌉p − 2p − 4⌈m/2⌉ + 1 ciphertexts, plus the cost of squaring a ⌈m/2⌉ + 1 digit
number. Lastly, we compute our desired square
X2 = Cpm − Cp⌈m/2⌉ +Bp⌈m/2⌉ − Ap⌈m/2⌉ + A
for 10mp− 6m+ 4⌈m/2⌉p− 3⌈m/2⌉+ 6p− 4 ciphertexts. Thus we have a recurrence
S(m) = S(⌊m/2⌋)+S(⌈m/2⌉)+S(⌈m/2⌉+1)+10mp− 6m+10⌈m/2⌉p− 7⌈m/2⌉+4p− 3.
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5. Performance
5.1. Montgomery multiplication.
Performance of Bajard-Imbert RNS algorithm
versus our base p algorithm for Montgomery multiplication:
N bit len RNS Base 2 Base 3 Base 5 Base 7 Base 11
139 1.48 ∗ 105 3.35 ∗ 105 3.90 ∗ 105 3.77 ∗ 105 4.15 ∗ 105 4.90 ∗ 105
350 1.30 ∗ 106 1.40 ∗ 106 1.68 ∗ 106 1.71 ∗ 106 1.80 ∗ 106 2.18 ∗ 106
585 4.68 ∗ 106 3.35 ∗ 106 3.92 ∗ 106 3.78 ∗ 106 4.23 ∗ 106 5.03 ∗ 106
835 1.16 ∗ 107 5.50 ∗ 106 7.14 ∗ 106 6.91 ∗ 106 7.56 ∗ 106 8.70 ∗ 106
1364 4.17 ∗ 107 1.26 ∗ 107 1.51 ∗ 107 1.54 ∗ 107 1.62 ∗ 107 1.92 ∗ 107
1924 1.04 ∗ 108 2.21 ∗ 107 2.64 ∗ 107 2.61 ∗ 107 2.88 ∗ 107 3.43 ∗ 107
2504 2.09 ∗ 108 3.27 ∗ 107 4.05 ∗ 107 4.10 ∗ 107 4.14 ∗ 107 5.05 ∗ 107
We found that the base p arithmetic-based Montgomery multiplication implementation
outperformed the Bajard-Imbert RNS algorithm for all values of N with bit length & 500.
This was surprising to us because the RNS algorithm took full advantage of free addition
and we expected it to perform better than an implementation in a positional number system.
However, the overhead associated with converted back and forth between the left and right
RNS, including base extension, meant that the RNS algorithm was less efficient overall.
5.2. Montgomery squaring.
Performance of Bajard-Imbert RNS algorithm
versus our base p algorithm for Montgomery squaring:
N bit len RNS Base 2 Base 3 Base 5 Base 7 Base 11
139 1.43 ∗ 105 3.40 ∗ 105 3.30 ∗ 105 3.14 ∗ 105 3.37 ∗ 105 4.03 ∗ 105
350 1.28 ∗ 106 1.45 ∗ 106 1.43 ∗ 106 1.44 ∗ 106 1.51 ∗ 106 1.78 ∗ 106
585 4.62 ∗ 106 3.42 ∗ 106 3.32 ∗ 106 3.20 ∗ 106 3.48 ∗ 106 4.15 ∗ 106
835 1.15 ∗ 107 5.72 ∗ 106 6.08 ∗ 106 5.72 ∗ 106 6.31 ∗ 106 7.25 ∗ 106
1364 4.15 ∗ 107 1.29 ∗ 107 1.29 ∗ 107 1.29 ∗ 107 1.36 ∗ 107 1.58 ∗ 107
1924 1.03 ∗ 108 2.24 ∗ 107 2.27 ∗ 107 2.16 ∗ 107 2.38 ∗ 107 2.84 ∗ 107
2504 2.09 ∗ 108 3.38 ∗ 107 3.42 ∗ 107 3.42 ∗ 107 3.45 ∗ 107 4.17 ∗ 107
We found that in the special case of squaring, the Bajard-Imbert RNS algorithm expe-
rienced only a slight improvement in ciphertext cost, likely because the inputs being the
same did not reduce the overhead needed for Montgomery reduction at all, while the base p
implementations saw a more significant improvement. We also found that base 3 and base
5 performed better than binary for some values of N.
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